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Abstract
This paper aims to contribute to understand the role of entrepreneurship in fragile states, which 
despite the practical interest and relevance has been somewhat disregarded in academic research. 
Given the necessity to support policy formulation with appropriate and relevant measurement of 
entrepreneurship and the business environment, the primary focus in this paper is to scrutinise 
existing international indicators, in particular the World Bank Doing Business Indicators (DBIs) 
and ask whether they are able to capture entrepreneurial dynamics and constructively guide policy 
making towards entrepreneurship in fragile state. 
The paper argues that DBIs give a partial picture of the nexus between institutional context, policy 
reforms,   entrepreneurship   and   economic   development.   In   particular,   DBIs   analysis   fails   in 
addressing three pivotal aspects: first, the process through which individuals become entrepreneurs, 
second, industrial cooperative and competitive relationships both intersectoral and across different 
sectors of the economy, and third, the characteristics of workers employed in enterprises. 
Consequently, DBIs are not able to capture innovation and changing processes, and miss some 
pivotal features of both the internal and the external environment of the enterprise. The paper 
maintains that these shortcomings are particularly serious when referred to fragile countries and 
discusses how and to what extent DBIs lead to adverse-effect policy recommendations, being 
inadequate for policy planning in fragile areas. 
1 This paper was presented at the UNU-WIDER Project Workshop on Entrepreneurship and Conflict held at INCORE, 
Londonderry, Northern Ireland, 20-21 March 2009. I am grateful to the participants at the workshop, and in particular 
Wim Naudé, for useful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.Measuring the Business Environment for Entrepreneurship:
SMEs, Quality of Institutions and Development
Chiara Guglielmetti
Introduction
More than a billion people live in around fifty developing countries that have been described as 
‘fragile states’ (Naudé et al. 2008). In fragile states, governments lack the authority, legitimacy and 
often the willingness to promote economic development. According to Binzel and Brück (2007: 5) 
fragility refers to ‘the existence of persistent, systematic, significant and interrelated social, political 
and economic uncertainties’. Many fragile states are mired in conflict, or just entering into a post-
conflict phase, or have histories of long and deep conflict. Understanding the dynamics of 
development in such states have become a defining global challenge, as there is agreement that little 
progress will be made in terms of achieving progress in the areas of global public goods such as 
addressing security, climate change and migration unless the issue of fragile states are addressed. 
Increasingly,   donors   and   international   development   agencies   are   turning   to   private   sector 
development where state capacity is lacking. Promoting entrepreneurship in fragile states, and in 
conflict and post-conflict situations, have therefore assumed high importance in strategies dealing 
with fragile states (Naudé 2009). 
This paper aims to contribute to understanding the role of entrepreneurship in fragile states, which 
despite the practical interest and relevance has been somewhat disregarded in academic research. 
Given the necessity to support policy formulation with appropriate and relevant measurement of 
entrepreneurship and the business environment, the primary focus in this paper is to scrutinise 
existing international indicators, in particular the World Bank (WB) Doing Business Indicators 
(DBIs) and ask whether they are able to capture entrepreneurial dynamics and constructively guide 
policy making towards entrepreneurship in fragile state. The paper argues that the DBI gives a partial picture of the nexus between institutional context, 
policy reforms, entrepreneurship and economic development. In particular, DB analysis fails in 
addressing three pivotal aspects: first, the process through which individuals become entrepreneurs, 
second, the relationships between enterprises, both intersectoral and across different sectors of the 
economy, and third, the characteristics of workers employed in enterprises. In doing so, DB is not 
able to capture innovation and changing processes, which are the essence of an entrepreneurial 
economy and fails in capturing both the internal environment of the enterprise and the economic, 
social, political environment of which the entrepreneurship is a part. These shortcomings are 
particularly serious when referred to post-conflict countries. DB approach and design disregards 
context-specific variables which are critical in the process of reconstruction and development. The 
paper lists some methodological limitations to the Index. In particular, six areas are considered 
relevant for business environments which are not measured by DB: proximity to large markets, 
quality of infrastructure, security, macroeconomic stability, corruption, the labour skill of the 
population, the underlying strength of institutions (DB07 2008; 2009). This notwithstanding, the 
aforementioned partial approach leads to a distorted analysis of the characteristics of the policy 
environment because the DB index is explicitly normative. This paper discusses how and to what 
extent DB indicators lead to ‘adverse-effect’ policy recommendations, being inadequate for policy 
planning in fragile states and post-conflict areas. 
The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. In the next section a conceptual framework is 
presented to relate the business environment in fragile and post-conflict states to entrepreneurship. 
Then, the DBIs will be discussed, and related to the circumstances in fragile and post-conflict states.
The business environment in fragile and post-conflict states: a conceptual 
framework
In  fragile and post-conflict states, the following aspects are pivotal to understand the business 
environment. First, the role and the strength of formal and informal institutions have to be emphasized. This is important for a number of reasons. Post-conflict countries are in particular need 
of a comprehensive public effort to recover war-damaged infrastructures and to provide a larger 
amount of public goods, in order to re-create an environment able to convey dispersed resources.
Moreover, institutions can play a major role in creating a more secure, stable and predictable 
environment. As Stiglitz (2006) stresses, conflict can be seen as an extreme form of breakdown of 
the society. During the transition from war to peace, the socioeconomic, political, formal and 
informal institutional environment is atypically unpredictable and can be highly unstable
1. The 
implications for economic and non-economic incentives to become an entrepreneur are manifold. 
As far as private portfolio decisions are concerned, the willingness to make long-term investments 
or irreversible and process-dependent investments is particularly low (Alesina et. al. 1992; Alesina 
and Perotti 1993), and private portfolios are made up of a considerably greater amount of liquid 
assets than in ‘normal’ conditions. Moreover, as a war-economy has been short of investments for a 
long time, economic agents are prone to mainly invest in easy-tradable goods which are likely to 
offer a high return (Collier and Gunning 1994). Therefore, there is a high risk of adverse selection 
behaviours by private agents, which can lead to a sub-optimal amount of those investments that 
foster sustainable growth and a more stable environment.
Moreover, conflicts and state fragility offer remarkable possibilities for profits and rents. In this 
scenario, the role played in a possible relapse into conflict by incumbent or new economic agents 
cannot be underestimated. As a matter of fact, post-conflict economic recovery implies restructuring 
the basis of a competitive market as well as the re-allocation, or the repression, of misallocated 
resources. 
Second, the issue of a productive allocation of entrepreneurial resources, which is important in any 
economic system, acquires a specific relevance in post-conflict dynamics. 
1 Collier and Gunning (1994) identify three kind of insecurities affecting private economic agents in the aftermath of 
African civil wars: micro-level insecurity,  (...) because civil warfare leaves a legacy of an armed population 
desensitiezed to violence; macro-insecurity, which is the fear that the state will be overthrown by insurrection (Collier, 
1994), and large fiscal shocks.Fragile and post-conflict countries are characterized by the necessity of structural adjustment in 
terms of the reallocation of resources. The shift from war to a peace economy implies scaling back 
military spending, which may mean the need to redirect production and, more often, acquisition 
from external suppliers. The so-called and often overemphasized ‘peace dividend’, a buzzword in 
European and US political debate during the post cold-war period, needs to be seen as being closely 
connected to the overall strength and capability of institutions and to be considered in a long-term 
perspective. The state has to face increased sources of expenditure. In comparison with non-conflict 
affected situations, the country has less possibility to make use of domestic debt instruments, as 
private agents are less prone to invest in an uncertain political environment. 
Economies in transition from war to peace are characterized by the presence of individuals who 
have been out of economic processes as they have been exiled, displaced or engaged in military 
activities. Therefore, during the transition there are possible working or entrepreneurial resources – 
veterans, exiles – that must be productively re-allocated, or allocated, in a peace economy. 
Another common aspect of post-conflict states is the different role played by women during war-
time. Even though strictly connected to war context dynamics, a twofold aspect, can be evidenced 
which is noteworthy in our perspective. On one side, women are, and remain during conflict, 
definitely vulnerable economic agents (USAID 2007). On the other, war is likely to modify gender 
relations, affecting the male breadwinner family structure where it exists. In post-conflict dynamics 
women can acquire importance as economic agents, with possible strong implications for the 
economic structure. Nevertheless, this shift does not necessarily imply increased economic or 
political power and can also lead to a more uneven playing field. 
The types of barriers which individuals face in fragile states are both harsher and more diversified. 
As far as the allocation of economic resources is concerned, a crucial aspect to be considered is the 
individual necessity to adapt to a changing environment, re-calibrating knowledge, personal 
endowments and capabilities. This is important for entrepreneurs and enterprise employees both 
from a personal and a social point of view.In our perspective, there are mainly three relevant characteristics of the entrepreneur. First, the 
Kirznerian (1973; 1979; 1985; 1992; and 2000) alertness and arbitrage of opportunities, which 
encompass   both   Schumpeterian   creators   (Schumpeter   1934)   and   individuals  acting 
entrepreneurially even when they might not be seen as Schumpeterian creators (Kirzner 2009). 
Second, the creation and exploitation of opportunities by investments in new knowledge (Acs et al. 
2009), as endogenous growth models suggest (Romer 1990; Aghion and Howitt 1992). Third, the 
Schumpeterian exploitation of existing knowledge, totally or partially unused by incumbent 
companies, through the transmission of knowledge spillovers (Acs et al. 2009; Audretsch 1995). 
The rationale of shaping a ‘business friendly environment’, a regulation which does not hamper 
entrepreneurship culture and is not burdensome to entrepreneurs, is rooted in the very essence of the 
entrepreneurial function. As Kirzner (2009) highlights (...) it does seem intuitively obvious that 
alertness can be ‘switched off’ by the conviction that external intervention will confiscate (wholly 
or in part) whatever one might notice (...) public policies that to any degree deaden the excitement 
inspired   by   the   prospect   of   pure   entrepreneurial   profit   must   surely   lower   the   level   of 
entrepreneurial alertness. These kinds of policies, i.e. cutting the red tape of a burdensome 
regulation, granting the rule of law and reducing taxes are, according to Naudè, a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition for development (Naudé 2007; 2009). Relying more on what Shackle called 
judgment of possibilities than on a calculation of certainties (Shackle 1982), entrepreneurship can 
hardly be considered as a by-product (Schramm 2004; Wohlmuth 2004) of a precise set of reforms, 
especially in post-conflict countries. Important literature has recently emphasized the pivotal role 
played  by knowledge and skills in  processes of innovation,  development and  catching-up, 
highlighting how competences are becoming a conditio sine qua non in all economic sectors in a 
global competitive environment. In the Knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship, recently 
introduced by Acs and Braunerhjelm, Audretsch and Carlsson (2009), the role of entrepreneurs in 
the process of intra-temporal knowledge spillover is investigated. The theory gives precious insights 
into the microeconomic foundations of the theory of endogenous growth and highlights the endogenous nature of opportunities, regarded by the prevailing entrepreneurship literature as 
exogenous. 
As far as company employees are concerned, the focus on labour market flexibility can lead to 
underestimating the importance of other firm dynamics which are fundamental in the perspective of 
an entrepreneurial economy (Audretsch and Thurik 2000; 2004; Carree and Thurik 2006; see also 
Acs et al. 1999; Wennekers and Thurik 1999 ). The diffusion of diversified competences at different 
company levels is likely to be undermined by a highly uncertain and fast changing labour market. 
Another aspect of particular relevance in post-conflict countries is social mobility, which is 
important both for conflict and economic dynamics. As Stiglitz (2006) highlights, restricted social 
mobility is often a cause of civil strife. From an economic point of view, it constrains resource 
allocation with sub-optimal social outcomes. A consequence of conflicts can be a remarkable 
shrinking of the social mobility of specific groups of the population. The presence of displaced 
communities and of ethnic or religious minorities being persecuted or segregated by social, political 
and economic life, can have severe economic implications which cannot be underestimated. These 
dynamics are also likely to modify the equilibrium of the neighbouring countries. 
In summary, at least five aspects of the complex process that turns individuals into entrepreneurs 
have to be considered: entrepreneurial capabilities, knowledge/skills, motivation, social mobility, 
and, of course, economic incentives.
Third, social ties and economic networks need to be re-built or created (Stiglitz 2006; Smallbone 
and Welter 2001). Post-conflict countries are characterized by a fractioned environment, in which 
social relations and networks among economic agents, both individuals and enterprises, have been 
abruptly interrupted. Lower cooperation and undermined company networks represent a severe 
problem as far as innovative and catching-up capabilities of developing countries is concerned. The 
nexus   between   the   process   of   catching-up,   policy   and   institutions   has   been   contentiously 
approached by literature. Recent research (Fagerberg and Godinho 2005; Fagerberg et al. 2005) 
stresses that local innovation systems and networks are crucial aspects, in which of importance is the space for institutional and political support. Cooperation among society’s members, as Stiglitz 
(2006) stresses, can be fostered by the legal system and by a system of incentive rewarding 
cooperation.
Therefore, in fragile and post-conflict states the need to create, re-create and strengthen economic 
networks is particularly high (Cusmano et al. 2008; Fagerberg and Godinho 2005; Mazzoleni and 
Nelson 2007; Mytelka 2004; Niosi 2008) in order to develop new and fresh economic resources and 
to consolidate the transition towards a peace economy. The issue is crucial for rent-based 
economies (Stiglitz 2006). As a matter of fact, in a rent-economy incentives to cooperate are low 
and economic resources are likely to be seen as a fixed amount, with agents playing a zero-sum 
game. Moreover, the opportunity costs of conflicts are lower than in an investment-based economy. 
Therefore, company networks and cooperation among enterprises, along with a competitive market 
structure, represent an important aspect.  In summary, fragile and post-conflict state policy priorities 
may differ from those of non-conflict-affected countries because the necessities per se are different, 
but also because problems are atypically severe and they are atypically sensitive to specific reform 
processes (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). Collier and Hoeffler (2002) analyse the effectiveness of aids 
in post-conflict areas and whether and how priorities for the reform of policies, governance and 
institutions might differ in post-conflict societies from those in other developing countries. The 
study stresses how growth is more sensitive to policy in post-conflict states and how social policies 
should be the key priority, while sectoral and macro policies should have broadly the same priority 
than in other contexts. 
As shown below, DB conceptualization seems to lack awareness of these specificities and fails in 
understanding some pivotal aspects of post-conflict pro-entrepreneurship policies.
The doing business indicators
The DBIs are designed to measure the factors determining the levels of entrepreneurial activity in a 
wide range of countries (181 countries, DB09), including countries that are the arena of conflict and many post-conflict states, and to identify institutional and political reforms which can foster 
entrepreneurship. The WB has taken into consideration the highly specific characteristics of post-
conflict states and their atypical need of financial resources and policy advice (Collier and Hoeffler 
2002), as well as the risks of ignoring their peculiar features. About 23 out of 181 countries taken 
into consideration by DB are conflict affected, while 40 out of 181 can be considered post-conflict 
countries. This notwithstanding, the DBI does not explicitly deal with the impact of conflict or state 
fragility on entrepreneurship. As far as a mere linguistic analysis is concerned, the terms ‘conflict’ 
and ‘post-conflict’ appear once in DB09, for the first time in all the DB report series. 
International indicators of the quality of institutions are becoming quite influential for policymakers 
and governments, mainly when addressed to fragile countries. In particular, the DB, of which six 
successive editions have been released up to now (IBRD, WB 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008a; and 
2008c; see also 2002), is gaining momentum in the academic debate and the political arena. The 
relevance of DB is twofold: both positive and normative. DB reports claim transparency in 
providing updated and far reaching (unbalanced) panel data on 181 countries and ranking the 
countries according to 10 dimensions through a new approach to the measurement of the ease of 
doing business (DB04). The principal aim of the indicators, however, is to guide reform of the 
scope and efficiency of government regulation in order to foster entrepreneurship and thus promote 
economic, social and human development. The first DB report explicitly stresses the normative 
function of the index: the purposes of DB are to encourage reforms through country benchmarking, 
inform the design of the reforms, enrich international initiatives on development effectiveness and 
inform theory (DB04).
It is worth noting that the WB has been using DB data in establishing conditions towards its debtors 
and   that   the   International   Development   Association   (IDA)   has   set  Business   Regulatory 
Environment as one of the criteria in the country policy and institutional assessment
2. Moreover, the 
2 See the Assessment Questionnaire of the IDA, Business Regulatory Environment criterion (p. 16; CPIA, IDA 2007) 
and the case of Afghan reforms on procedures to start up a business, financed by USAID (DB2007)Millennium Challenge Corporation
3(MCC) also relies on DB data to build its six governance 
indicators
4 for the eligibility of assistance programmes and for the Millennium Challenge Account 
selection criteria (MCC 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; and 2007). 
Therefore, even though the indexes do not directly guide the economic behaviour of small and 
medium enterprises, they may indirectly condition their economic decisions in two ways: by 
guiding the choices of policymakers and governments, by establishing a reward logic as far as 
international aid is concerned, and by contributing to make a country  more appealing  for 
international investment. Moreover, DB role is likely to be more influential in the countries affected 
by political, institutional, economic and social fragilities.
What are the DB Indicators that are most affected by post-conflict dynamics? How and to what 
extent can fragile states specificities hamper the effectiveness of the Indicators? Is DB capable of 
detecting the inputs of those entrepreneurial resources through which the market process can be set 
in motion (Kirzner 2009)?
DB measures different kinds of inputs of entrepreneurship development and ranks the countries 
according to 10 dimensions  on the premise that an entrepreneurial private sector promotes 
economic growth and increases opportunities for poor people. Important literature (Audretsch and 
Thurik 2004;  Kauffman Foundation 2007;  Naudé 2007; 2009) has recently emphasized the 
importance of considering and supporting inputs of entrepreneurial economy, rather than only 
outputs (companies). This statement seems particularly relevant in post-conflict countries, where 
the legacies of pre-conflict and conflict dynamics may represent an obstacle to a productive 
allocation of economic resources. 
Moreover, fragile states are likely to be short of inputs recognized as conduits of long-term 
entrepreneurial development. Whilst Audretsch and Thurik (2004) and Naudé (2007) stress the 
3 The MCC, a US government corporation established in 2004, is responsible for the stewardship of the MCA, funded 
by the Congress with the aim of channelling funds to developing countries.
4 The business start up index (made up of the DB indicators Costs to Start a business and Days to start a business 
combined with equal weight) and the days to register property and cost of registering property indicators (two of the 
three indicators which make up land rights and access index) use as sources DB data. fundamental role of knowledge and skills, the Kauffman Foundation (2007) indicates four policy 
subjects that are of uppermost importance to innovative entrepreneurs: ensuring a skilled workforce, 
reforming healthcare, promoting innovation and limiting overly burdensome regulation and liability 
litigation. As a matter of fact, DB relies mostly, if not only, on the latter. By analysing DB 
construction, the indicators adopted, data selection and policy recommendations, it is possible to 
discriminate between two broad categories of policies: policies aimed at establishing the rule of law 
– i.e. registering property, protecting investors and enforcing contracts – and policies focused on the 
elimination of barriers to entrepreneurship – i.e. starting a business, dealing with construction 
permits, employing workers, getting credit, paying taxes, trading across borders and closing a 
business. On the premise that a vibrant private sector – with firms making investments, creating 
jobs, and improving productivity – promotes growth and expands opportunities for poor people and 
that  in many countries  (...)  entrepreneurial activity remains limited, poverty high, and growth 
stagnant (...) DB reports are based on the thesis that although macro policies are unquestionably 
important (...) the quality of business regulation and the institutions that enforce it are a major 
determinant of prosperity (...) (DB04: viii). This preliminary statement introduces two key issues on 
which the DB is constructed: the process through which entrepreneurship enhances social and 
economic development and the role played by institutions. The four following questions are 
therefore crucial in tracing the DB theoretical framework: what do DB mean by development, how 
do DB define entrepreneurship; which institutional assets and dynamics do DB consider to enhance 
processes of entrepreneurial promotion and, finally, which institutional assets and dynamics do DB 
consider favour the pivotal role of entrepreneurship in development? 
DB reports omit any explicit definition and lack rigorous analytical answers to all four questions. 
There are two plausible reasons for this. 
Firstly, DB data are meant to be transparent and, therefore, objective. As aforementioned, one of the 
aims of the DB is to  inform theory, producing new indicators(...)  facilitating  tests of existing 
theories and  contribute  to the empirical foundation for new theoretical work on the relation between regulation and development (DB04). Thus, one of the purposes seems to present empirical 
evidence on business regulation which justify an ex post adherence to theoretical positions. 
Secondly, a number of key concepts are regarded as unquestionable and automatically interacting 
with each other. But concepts do matter, both when positive and normative statements are 
concerned. Different assumptions may lead to different conclusions, determining which aspects of a 
phenomenon are measured. Lack of clarity on definitions and on assumptions hinders critical 
analysis of the results presented and the full awareness of the objectives pursued by policy 
recommendations
5.
This   section   deals   with   the  potential   relevance   and   shortcomings   of   DB   to   the   specific 
circumstances represented by post-conflict countries, singling out a number of aspects which need 
to be taken into consideration and eliciting DB theoretical framework from indicator analysis. 
The indicators which analyse policies aimed at establishing the rule of law address crucial aspects 
of post-conflict dynamics. Macro-insecurity is actually likely to substantially undermine reliance on 
public services. For example, contested property rights are a legacy of civil wars (Collier 1994). At 
the same time, regulations which protect investors are likely to help stabilize an uncertain 
environment, increasing the opportunity costs of not investing.  Therefore, the development of 
Indicators such as Enforcing Contracts, Registering Properties, Protecting Investors, as well as 
Getting credit, is useful in addressing some pivotal aspects of those market-supporting institutions 
which need to be reconstructed and strengthened in a conflict affected environment. It is also worth 
noting that the two exceptions to an approach drastically against public intervention in market 
processes are related to two of these indicators: in the background paper of the  getting credit 
indicator, the authors stress the importance of public credit registries for the development of credit 
market institutions in developing countries, highlighting how this can be considered as  a rare 
example of an apparently successful state intervention (Djankov et al. 2006: 26). Moreover, the 
5 The issue of the neutrality of the data cannot obviously be analysed in this paper, whose objective is simply to 
highlight the unavoidable implicit theoretical choice at the basis of any empirical research and the risks of 
mystifications of an excessive emphasis on de-contextualized quantitative data.background paper on protecting investors indicator (Djankov et al. 2006)
6, is explicitly against a 
laissez-faire approach in the stock market, and stresses the necessity of an active public sector 
whose pivotal role is to regulate the playing field enforcing private actors as far as both access to 
information (through extensive disclosure, approval by disinterested shareholders) and power to act 
(voting and litigation) are concerned. Fines and criminal sanction, on the other hand, seem not to 
benefit the stock market.
The more relevant indicators dealing with barriers to entrepreneurship will be considered, namely 
starting a business, paying taxes, employing workers and dealing with construction permits. 
It has been already stated that DB does not address the issue of conflict-affected countries at all. 
Even in regional or national reports, DB does not consider any context variables. The DB approach 
is based upon a standard vision of the globalisation process, according to which progressive 
interaction and integration of economies lead to a convergence of institutional and political 
solutions, practices and standards. The criticism this paper makes of this approach is twofold. 
Firstly, the interaction between convergence, measurement and simplification in DB risks becoming 
a race to the bottom in a number of crucial institutional and political features; secondly, a different 
vision is upheld, according to which development process is traced by the interaction between 
forces that generate a progressive convergence, and national and local specificities. The interaction 
is therefore a process that changes, influenced by the interacting of local, national and global actors 
and forces. Thus the analysis needs to consider how local actors and forces respond and cope with 
institutional and political reforms and to discriminate strategies accordingly. DB upholds a strategy 
of development which neither contextualises information nor interprets it accordingly, disregarding 
the role of historical, institutional and cultural heritage, which is often only anecdotically evocated. 
The necessity of a full recognition of the unique characteristics of emerging economies is strongly 
stated in recent literature (Bruton et al. 2008), which criticises the extension of existing theory and 
emphasises the importance of developing new theories in order to understand entrepreneurship in 
6 In which an anti-self-dealing index is calculated.different contexts. DB identifies different solutions in relation to the stage of development of a 
country in just two precise cases. The good practice of private inspections in the procedure of 
issuing building licences (introduced in Finland in 2004) is regarded as unworkable in developing 
countries. The reason is that, in developing countries, courts are likely to be less efficient and the 
risk of revocation of professional licences is likely to be poorly effective in inducing private 
inspectors to act correctly. As far as closing a business is concerned, while rich countries have 
developed complex bankruptcy procedures, which need high institutional and administrative 
capabilities, developing countries should focus on less formal methods to enforce payment of the 
secured debt. 
A one size can fit all (DB04) development strategy, which is made up of a number of predefined 
steps   that   foster   entrepreneurship,   comes   from   this   perspective.   The   assumption   is   that 
improvements in a business environment occur through a precise set of de novo reforms. The one 
size fits all perspective, whose failure has been emphasized by important literature (Easterly 2001; 




The assumptions and theoretical statements used to make businesses comparable across countries 
identify a specific target of DB indicators: a vibrant private sector (DB04) mainly made up of 
domestic, small and medium size enterprises regarded as a fundamental engine for growth, 
employment and development, i.e. entrepreneurial SMEs. 
But entrepreneurial function does not acquire a distinct, specific role in DB reports: entrepreneur, 
manager and owner of an ongoing business are often regarded as synonymous. Even though they often appear to partially overlap in practice, they are nevertheless functionally and theoretically 
distinct (Baumol 1968). This distinction has both analytical and political implications. 
The choice by DB of measuring entrepreneurship by focusing on the number of registered 
enterprises
7 partly depends upon the availability of comparable statistical data, but the implications 
are nevertheless important as far as DB explanatory power is concerned, especially in post-conflict 
dynamics. 
Data concerning business death rates, business churn, net business population growth and survival 
rates seem pivotal in connecting the act of doing business with an entrepreneurial function and in 
assessing long term sustainability and development potential of the private sector, along with its 
potential to influence the welfare and growth of a disrupted country
8. The issue is taken into 
consideration by the principal indicators of entrepreneurship, such as GEM, which places particular 
stress on innovation, and the Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity (2008). The latter, for 
example, relies on the creation of new businesses as well, measuring new US business owners in 
their first month of significant business activity. The approach of the Kauffman Foundation aims at 
capturing the qualitative aspects of business activity, presenting separate estimates for gender, 
demographic groups, States, metropolitan statistical areas, sector of activity. The aim here is 
obviously not to compare the two indexes but to outline the possibilities offered by different 
approaches. 
Thus two issues arise. The first concerns what DB indicators really measure? Entrepreneurship or 
business? If the index only had descriptive and analytical purposes, the focus would be on correctly 
presenting the data, which are undoubtedly a unique source of precious information on  doing 
business worldwide. The second issue is based upon the normative approach of DB. On the premise 
that what gets measured gets done, to clarify what is actually measured acquires a normative value. 
7 See the Starting a business indicator methodology and the background paper on the Paying Taxes indicator (Djankov 
et al., 2007), in which entrepreneurship is measured by the  business density measure  (defined as the number of 
registered establishments per 100 members of the working population) and the business registration measure (defined 
as the average 2000-2004 ratio of business registrations over the number of business establishments). 
8 OECD SME and Entrepreneurship Outlooks and the General Entrepreneurship Monitor have developed an analysis 
framework which encompasses these kind of data, but the concrete availability of this sort of cross sectional 
information is quite poor at the moment (see also OECD 2001b, 2003, 2007a, 2007b, 2008).The problem is acknowledged by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), a unit within the WB in 
charge of the assessment of IFC work towards the private sector: ‘the DB indicators deal with the 
part of the regulatory regime that governs the start-up, operation, and growth of businesses (...) DB 
assesses the burden of regulation on firms without aiming to capture the social or economy-wide 
benefits that regulations yield, such as safety, environmental protection, worker protection, or 
transparency. DB offers a consistent yardstick for comparing countries on regulation as seen from 
the firm’s private point of view. But a complete appreciation of the quality of the business climate 
must also measure the quality of infrastructure, labour skills, competition policies, and other 
determinants and outcomes of investment and profitability’ (IEG, 2008). The explicit normative 
function given to the DB since the very beginning seems to sharply contrast with the statement that 
is necessary to keep in mind (...) the context and the perspective of what DB really measures (IEG 
2008)
9. 
The DB entrepreneur is a standard economic agent. His choices are predictable because they are 
guided by an individualistic view, according to which the main purposes are to maximize profit and 
to optimise the choice between regular or irregular economy. The DB approach seems therefore to 
follow the approach to entrepreneurship of neoclassical microeconomics, which is based upon 
short-run market equilibrium and on standard, rational maximizer agents. According to the 
mainstream approach, economic agents act in perfectly competitive product markets, in which 
technology is given and individual workers and entrepreneurs are price takers (Parker 2004). 
This perspective fits particularly well the one size can fit all strategy and disregards a number of 
aspects that are pivotal in research on entrepreneurship. Research on entrepreneurship has not 
developed a dominant paradigm up to now (Grégoire et al. 2001): in its history it is possible to 
identify a number of swarms, which Landström (2004) links to different economic development 
stages.   At  the   same   time,   different  strands   can   be   singled   out  in   future   development  of 
entrepreneurship research (Corbetta et al. 2004). It is possible to elicit from different conceptions of 
9 Author’s emphasis.function and origin of entrepreneurship some common aspects which allow one to discriminate 
between neoclassical economics on one side, and entrepreneurship research in a stricter sense on the 
other (Baumol 1968; 1983; 1993; 2004; and 2005; Barreto 1989; Casson 1987; 2003; Kirchhoff 
1991; Metcalfe 2004; Parker 2004; Rosen 1997). 
As a case study the DB reports use a domestically owned limited liability company, which operates 
in the country’s most populous city and employing between 10 and 50 national employees,. The 
representativeness and comparability of the example chosen varies significantly both in respect to 
different countries and to different regions within the same country. Not only may this choice not 
be representative of regulatory practices in other parts of the country (DB04 2005; 2006; 2007; 
2008), but it also disregards how deeply local and regional conditions influence entrepreneurship 
development and how policy enforcement may be better in the capital city. For example, a common 
feature of developing countries is high interregional inequalities in terms of income per capita, 
labour demand and development of entrepreneurship.
As far as post-conflict dynamics are concerned, five aspects need to be considered: transaction 
costs,  environmental insecurity and uncertainty, sources and role of innovation, in particular 
knowledge and skills and firms networks, and social mobility. 
The theme of security of property is pivotal in the DB approach, of which the Coase theorem seems 
to be one of the pillars. But, if the reports keep stressing the fundamental role of well defined 
property rights in determining efficiency, they tend to disregard the presence of transaction costs. 
And   yet,   conflict   dynamics   remarkably   increase   transaction   costs,   bringing   about   social 
fragmentation and jeopardizing transactions (Collier 1994). For example, the starting a business 
indicator only takes into consideration compulsory costs and not the time needed to acquire 
information, the entrepreneur being aware of all entry regulations and their sequence from the 
beginning  (DB09). Assuming there is complete information, the risk becomes very high of 
unreliable results
10 and of a biased comparison among non-conflict and conflict affected countries, 
10 Real costs and time differ from data estimated, as the case of US procedure for registering sales tax testifies see 
Arruňada, 2007in which the concrete possibility of gathering information can dramatically differ. An unstable 
policy environment that changes often creates an uneven playing field. In such a situation those who 
have privileged access to information can make strategic choices, while others have to try to 
develop despite hostile external conditions (Smallbone and Welter 2001). 
The  indicator,   on   the  one  side,  lacks   any   concern   about   the  qualitative   characteristics   of 
entrepreneurs and businesses that are created (Smallbone and Welter 2001),  and, on the other, 
develops an  incomplete  analysis of the process which leads to start-ups, focusing  on a  partial 
consideration of the economic incentives to entrepreneurship.
What prevents an individual becoming an entrepreneur in a post-conflict country can significantly 
differ from non-conflict affected countries. As Smallbone and Welter (2001) note for transition 
countries, it is likely, under an unpredictably changing environment, that the aim of individuals is to 
protect themselves from uncertainties. A defensive more than entrepreneurial attitude, with cash 
flows utilized for raising general living standards and not for developing enterprise, and the amount 
of long-term and irreversible private investments is likely to be sub-optimal if the state does not 
subsidize investment choices (Collier and Gunning 1994). 
The  DB approach, moreover, completely disregards the sources and the role of innovation in 
development processes and seems rather focused on a static and traditional manufacturing economic 
system. As Fagerberg and Godinho (2005) highlight, the need to develop a system which is capable 
of innovating has become more difficult as the progressive technologies have become less 
‘congruent’ with the economic conditions (particularly skill-base and R&D infrastructure) that 
prevail in many developing countries. As far as catching-up processes of developing countries are 
concerned, links with the technology frontier and with markets and supply of needed skills are 
crucial aspects to consider (Fagerberg and Godinho 2005). In post-conflict countries the problem is 
likely to be harsher. Policies aimed at fostering personal skills and capabilities are a fundamental 
part of pro-entrepreneurship strategies, even though the relation between diffusion and commercial 
exploitation of knowledge is not straightforward, and the learning and creation of knowledge is not measurable (Smith 2005). This is true both for education, which can be evaluated only from a long-
term perspective, and for economic knowledge
11. As already highlighted by Arrow (1962), 
knowledge strongly differs from other factors of production. Traditional indicator of innovation, i.e. 
R&D expenditures and data on patents, seem to miss the very essence of the issue. On the one hand, 
as research on innovation has shown, R&D is not the principle type of expenditure in innovation. 
Since the seminal work of Rosenberg (1976; 1982) and Kline and Rosenberg (1986) and constantly 
confirmed by research on innovation, non-R&D input of innovation (training, design, market 
exploration, equipment acquisition and tooling up) is to be considered central in innovation 
processes (Smith 2005). On the other, data on patents tends to capture invention rather than 
innovation. Precious insights have been given by multi-indicator approaches and by innovation 
surveys, both focused on technological innovation and firm level innovation activities (see OECD, 
1992; 2001a; and 2002). This notwithstanding, these aspects seem unavoidable in assessing post-
conflict economic recovery and entrepreneurial promotion. 
It seems pivotal to monitor and assess policies aimed at creating and strengthening firms’ networks 
and at increasing information and knowledge sharing, all elements more and more necessary to 
foster innovation (Mazzoleni and Nelson 2007; Mytelka 2004; Niosi 2008). Moreover, in post-
conflict areas the environment is highly uncertain and rapidly changing and information is scarce 
and costly. These conditions make it more difficult than normal to identify reliable suppliers and 
customers. In the long process of post-war recovery, missing institutions are ‘substituted’ by long-
term relations between economic actors, as McMillan and Woodruff and 1999a; 1999b; 2002) have 
shown in the case of transition countries: longer and more repeated are the relationships between 
firms, suppliers and customers, greater are the incentives to cooperate (Stiglitz 2006). 
Social mobility acquires in a fractioned environment a particular relevance. One the one hand, 
addressing the economic potentialities of women is of major importance. The role of women role is 
11 The distinction between economic knowledge and knowledge in a broader sense has been emphasized by Arrow 
(1962). As Carlsson and Fridh (2002) and Acs et. Al. (2009) remember, only 1-2% of the inventions are successfully 
commercialized and between 10% -20% of licences yield significant income.remarkably disregarded by DB: despite the declared intention (DB08) of the development of an 
indicator measuring ‘opportunities for women’, DB09 does not address the issue at all. If included, 
such an indicator would substantially modify rankings (see for a proposal Hampel-Milagrosa 2008). 
On the other, the DB entrepreneur is assumed to be national, a strong assumption that acquires 
more relevance in post-conflict dynamics. The role of (ethnic or religious) minority and immigrant 
entrepreneurs (Naudé 2007) must be analyzed. The same can be said for entrepreneurs in diaspora 
and for return migration; recent literature  (McCormick and Wahba 2001; Taylor 2006)  has 
considered the role of the latter on the development of skilled entrepreneurship in their country of 
origin.
Doing Business, therefore, fails to stress the variety and the complexity of ways through which 
government can influence the productive allocation of entrepreneurship, failing in capturing 
fundamental inputs of entrepreneurial development. 
Assessment of the starting a business indicator
Starting a business ranks the countries according to four sub-indicators, the weighted average of 
which
12 forms the indicator: the number of procedures, time, cost and paid-in minimum capital 
necessary to start and legally run a business. Fewer procedures, and less time, cost and capital, 
increase the score a country acquires (Table 6.1).
The outcomes of easier and faster procedures to starting up a business are, in the DB approach, 
more start-ups, less informal economy, with consequently more protection of employees and higher 
productivity caused by increased entry pressure, which in turn leads to more competitiveness 
between enterprises. 
In post-conflict countries start-ups play an important role for a number of reasons. Firstly, as Naudè 
(2007) highlights, they are likely to have fewer legacies with conflict dynamics. A major task that 
must be dealt with in post-conflict economic recovery is the necessity to re-allocate into peace and 
12 25% each indicator.productive activities entrepreneurs who have been active during the conflict. The question is, on one 
side, to convey entrepreneurial resources, which need to adapt, to a new environment. On the other, 
during the first post-conflict period, societies are particularly unstable and the possibility of a 
relapse into conflict remains extremely high
13 (Azam et al. 1994; Collier 2000; 2006; Naude 2007).
The role played by economic agents in this phase cannot be underestimated. A major issue that 
must be tackled is dealing with those entrepreneurs that have gained economic and political power 
because of the conflict and therefore represent a force prone to increase instability and social, 
political and economic fragmentation. Even though the dynamics among forces in a fragile area 
tend to reproduce themselves, it can be stated that, according to Mcmillan and Woodruff’s (2002) 
analysis of the role of SMEs in transition economies, new SMEs can contribute to create a business 
environment more conducive to a productive allocation of entrepreneurship. 
Secondly, even though the evidence of a better performance of de novo companies in respect to the 
private sector as a whole are not uncontroversial (McMillan and Woodruff 2000; 2002 for transition 
countries), recent literature (Audretsch and Keilbach 2003; Audretsch et al. 2002; 2006) has 
emphasised the positive effect of start-ups on employment and growth. As outlined above, in post-
conflict countries there is a necessity to reallocate, or allocate economic agents that have been out 
of the economic process during the conflict.
Therefore, in this perspective, the DB focus on start-ups seems to properly address a 
specificity of post-conflict countries. Nevertheless, there are two aspects which need to be 
considered. First, the question that must be coped with in post-conflict countries is not the lack of 
entrepreneurial resources, but their productive allocation (Naudé 2007). This issue will be analysed 
in the next section. Second, procedures for starting up a business are equated to entry barriers which 
obstruct entrepreneurship and private investment. This statement is drawn from public choice 
theory on regulation and from the hypothesis that two procedures are  sufficient for business 
registration: notification of existence and tax and social security registration (DB04: 17 and 21; 
13 The World Bank estimates 44% possibility within 5 years.DB05: 19)
14. As noted by Arruñada (2007),  use of this simile  (i.e. procedure for starting up a 
business and entry barriers) leads to omission of the fact that, by incurring certain formalisation 
costs today, transaction costs in the future will be reduced, whereas conventional entry barriers do 
not generate this kind of positive effect
15. The perspective is a company’s short term private point of 
view, mainly considering private costs while the social and long-term private benefits of regulation 
are often disregarded. Regulation of entry is analysed merely from an entrepreneur’s perspective, 
taking into account only quantity and not quality and therefore disregarding the costs borne by other 
agents, namely public administration and courts (to whom registration formalisation provides 
necessary information) and other companies (due diligence) in the case of poor quality registration 
services. DB firmly upholds the elimination of minimum capital requirements and reliance on 
private contracts between creditors and debtors, which would substitute capital rules. This position 
is in line with an approach that mainly relies on the market as a source of efficiency, besides 
highlighting an element that supports the efficiency of common law. 
The basic hypothesis on which the reports are implicitly built is Baumol’s thesis of the 
fundamental role of institutions  in influencing  the allocation  of entrepreneurship  resources. 
According to this thesis, what varies most among countries is not the number of entrepreneurs or 
the   nature   of  their  objectives,   but   the  relative   pay   offs   society   offers  (Baumol   1990)   to 
entrepreneurial activities. It is therefore possible, and desirable, to modify the reward structure in 
the economic system in order to enhance a productive allocation of entrepreneurial resources. So, 
what is the role of regulation in a DB perspective? The background study (Djankhov et al. 2002) on 
which the starting a business indicator is methodologically and theoretically based, in accordance 
with De Soto’s work (1986; 2000), provides evidence
16 that the countries with more open access to 
14 While statistical registration, environmental permits, health benefits registering seem to be socially desiderable and 
local chamber of commerce approval can limit competition (DB2004, p.21), any other procedure for starting up a 
business has dubious purposes and negative social outcomes (prevent people from getting out of poverty, DB2008).
15 Arruñada (2007) comments the negative consequences as a result of reforms undertaken in El Salvador, Spain, 
Colombia, Afghanistan and praised by DB reports (DB2005, 2007). See also Bath, 2007; Blanchet, 2006; du Marais, 
2006 and du Marais et al, 2006.
16 The empirical research was conducted in 85 countries with 1999 data. The analysis takes the number of procedures, 
the official time and cost into consideration.political power, greater constraints on the executive, and greater political rights have less 
burdensome regulation of entry (...) than do the countries with less representative, less limited, and 
less free governments. This statement is presented as an ex-post and evidence-based adherence to 
public choice theory. Entry regulation is set up in order to benefit regulators, who seek to gain rents 
exerting unjustified control on private entrepreneurs, according to the toolbooth strand of public 
choice theory developed by McChesney (1987), De Soto (1986; 2000), Shleifer and Vishny (1993, 
1998). No efficiency or public interest reasons justify the majority of entry regulations; no empirical 
evidence support Pigou’s public interest theory of regulation. based on eight papers on pilot 
research on market regulation carried out by groups of researchers headed by Simeon Djankov
17. 
From our perspective, two aspects are relevant here: on the one side, the role played by state in re-
setting the rules of the game, in coordinating different economic actors, in facilitating economic 
exchanges and development, is substantially undervalued. On the other,  the  manichean  view 
(Arruñada 2007) which supports the entire DB theoretical framework represents the influence 
between business environment and entrepreneurial behaviour as a uni-directional relationship 
between two homogeneous parties, preventing DB from investigating more complex dynamics. The 
relationship between  the institutions of the market place and the spectrum of entrepreneurial 
behaviour it engenders and supports (Metcalfe 2004) is widely recognised, both politically and 
academically. But, first, it is important to take into account the influence that a particular social and 
cultural  milieu,   in   which   entrepreneurship   behaviour   develops,   may   exert   on   political   and 
institutional processes; and secondly, the dualistic vision, of institution and politics on one side and 
entrepreneurs on the other, does not take into account the spectrum of the heterogeneous forces 
involved. The response to the regulation of economic agents varies widely and does not often 
confirm the simplistic dualism regulation versus the free market. This holds particularly true as far 
as post-conflict dynamics are concerned. Moreover, the serious need for public intervention requires 
17 Three studies by Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh; seven studies by Ramalho, Shleifer, four studies by Hart , La Porta, four 
studies by Lopez-de-Silanes, Freund, Pham, Botero (see also Djankov et al, 2002, 2003, 2006a, b, c, 2007, 2008) an assessment of government level of corruption, effectiveness, capability to define a long-term 
strategy, all aspects disregarded by DB conceptualization, representing public intervention per se as 
a shortcoming in the economic system. 
Assessment of the paying taxes indicator
The  indicator ‘paying taxes’ measures amount, procedural and time requirements of taxes and 
government mandatory contributions
18 a SME is required to pay in a fiscal year. The indicator is 
made up of three indicators: tax payments for a manufacturing company, time required to comply 
with three major taxes and total tax rate.
The rationale of the indicator is that corporate taxes and social and labour contributions lessen 
the economic incentives to engage in an entrepreneurial venture, having, consequently, negative 
effects on aggregate investments, FDI and entrepreneurship activities and leading to slower 
economic growth, more reliance on debt than on equity
19  and more irregular economy. In DB 
analysis, burdensome regulation causes economic agents to give up their economic activities 
regularly carried out (or even not to engage in a regular economic activity) and force them to 
choose the unregulated alternative, which DB reports define an informal economy and estimate as 
the percentage of activity that is unofficial or not registered (Djankov et al. 2007). The concept of 
informal economy in the DB reports seems to identify economic activities carried out against the 
rules posed by a system – i.e. irregular economy (Dallago 1990) – not activity of self consumption, 
criminal activity or simply unrecorded activity. Thus it is worth noting that the method of 
calculation chosen overlaps two conceptually and logically distinct phenomena, and that the reports 
do not clarify their definition of informal economy, a controversial concept which encompasses a 
number of different actors and aspects.
18 The profit or corporate income tax, social contributions and labour taxes paid by the employer, property taxes, 
property transfer taxes, dividend tax, capital gaun tax, financial transactiontax, waste collection taxes and vehicle and 
road taxes.
19 These statements are presented as the results of the empirical research at the basis of paying taxes indicator (Djankov 
et al, 2007). The research data on 85 countries.Several caveats are necessary as far as post-conflict countries are concerned.
Collier (1994) highlights the decay of institutions and conventions of civil society – the private 
sector has learned how to evade the state –  and, consequently, the inadequacy of the state to 
effectively manage the tax-gathering system and to increase revenue without intensifying arbitrary 
actions. Moreover, the author states the necessity of setting low taxation on transactions in order to 
help the market recover. Nevertheless, returning to market implies a comprehensive effort aimed at 
restructuring the fundamental institutions, the formal and informal rules of the game, which can 
hardly be done by the interaction of private economic agents. A trade-off comes, in this perspective, 
between low taxes and a government budget capable of restoring and activating virtuous market 
mechanisms. 
The DB approach conceives of underdevelopment as being the result of private underutilised social 
and economic potential, as a waste of opportunity due to institutional frameworks which inhibit 
economic agents. The roadmap to development therefore means freeing the private sector from 
bureaucratic and political ties which hinder growth. 
Even though certainly setting up and developing businesses results from the creativity, drive and 
commitment of individuals rather than as a result of government action (Smallbone and Welter 
2001), the role of public intervention in post-conflict dynamics seems pivotal for at least five 
reasons, which represent increased sources of public expenditure. First, there is room for substantial 
state intervention to help war-damaged infrastructures recover, which is necessary to foster market 
processes. As a matter of fact, these kinds of public interventions can have a rapid and positive 
influence on the index trading across borders, which records procedural requirements for exporting 
and importing goods by ocean transport. Second, the state needs to ensure security in an 
environment   where   micro-insecurity   is   considerably   high.  Post-conflict   dynamics   exert   a 
remarkable influence on individuals’ portfolio choices, which, as mentioned above, are more liquid 
than normal, and on entrepreneurs, who are likely to prefer reversible and short-term investments. 
Therefore, lower taxes, which decrease government budgets, are likely to produce more individual savings rather than to foster private investments. Thus, public interventions which lessen micro-
instability and ease market exchange are important. Third, the role of the state as a facilitator of 
knowledge creation and sharing, investments and spillovers seems pivotal. Research that sustains 
the effects of policy environment, specifically, corporate-income tax rates, minimum wages and 
bankruptcy law, on entrepreneurship across US has been presented (Garrett and Wall 2006). 
Nevertheless, what Schramm (2004) stresses is the necessity of taking into account the whole 
system that supports entrepreneurship. The author presents the US system as being characterized by 
a number of correlated aspects that, along with favourable business policies and regulations, 
encompasses both the role of universities which are strongly engaged in research and firmly linked 
with enterprises, and the fundamental role of the government in funding programs and research in 
firms and universities. 
There are many conduits to entrepreneurial development which post-conflict countries are likely to 
be particularly short of: investments in R&D, the general level of knowledge, networks and 
relations among firms, high skilled employees who can detect and exploit opportunities, and social 
services, which can support and sustain entrepreneurial ventures by reducing individuals’ exposure 
to social risks. At the same time, post-conflict countries can be unusually respondent, with 
unexploited human resources and capabilities which can be very productively harnessed. Therefore, 
what seems necessary for private sector development are broadly-based institutional interventions 
aimed at supplying common goods such as training, technological capabilities and quality 
assurance (...). There is the need for regulative interventions encouraging larger local and foreign 
enterprises to adopt more socially inclusive patterns of sourcing and subcontracting (Schulpen and 
Gibbon 2001, for Sub-saharian Africa). Finally, the redistributive role of the state seems to be 
important in the phase of transition. Market disruption brings about a less competitive environment 
in which profit margins widen and there are more opportunities for rent positions; at the same time, 
opportunities for profits and rents, which would have been illegitimate in a non-conflict situation, 
arise (Collier 1994; Collier and Gunning 1994; Keen 1994). Thus, post-conflict societies are likely to be characterized by high income inequality and weak social protection. Two consequences are 
relevant here: first, high income inequality increases vulnerability and internal conflicts, and makes 
difficult the restoration of normal conditions. Second, higher income inequality implies a market 
characterized by weaker demand and lower individual capability to engage in entrepreneurial 
ventures. 
Another element which is worth noting about the paying taxes indicator is that social contribution 
and labour taxes are encompassed in order to measure all imposed charges that affect business 
accounts  (DB09). The construction of the index is in line with the DB approach towards the 
dynamics between entrepreneurs and workers, focusing on two desired policy outcomes: increasing 
flexibility of labour regulation and decreasing costs. The implication of the DB perspective will be 
discussed in the next section.
Assessment of the employing workers indicator
The indicator measures the regulation of employment, specifically how it affects the hiring and 
firing of workers and the rigidity of working hours (DB09), and is made up of five sub-indicators: 
difficulty of hiring, rigidity of hours, difficulty of firing, rigidity of employment and firing cost 
(Table 6.2).  
In the background paper of the indicator, Botero et al. (2004) present the results of a comparative 
empirical study on regulation of the labour market (employment, collective relations and social 
security laws) in 85 countries. The paper shows how higher regulation is associated with higher 
levels of unemployment and a larger irregular economy, and is therefore harsher on the weaker part 
of the work force, i.e. women and young people, and thus causes a de facto weakening of the 
system of social protection
20. The risk is to increase unemployment and to force individuals towards 
an irregular economy whilst trying to protect workers and regulate employment. If, in the DB 
20  Moreover Bertola tests the reliability of the indicators and the empirical findings of Botero et al. (2004) and 
concludes that the evidence presented is rough, far from clearcut and supporting simplicistic views of labour market 
institutions Bertola(2005).vision, public institutions often fail, reliance on the market leads to efficiency even in the labour 
market: if business does not provide its workers with adequate conditions of employment, other 
companies will attract the workers (DB04). DB therefore adopts a neoclassical approach to the 
labour market, in which real wages determine equilibrium, similar to what happens in any other 
market
21. DB09 highlights how overly rigid labour regulation brings about difficulties in adjusting 
to demand, limits firm size and discourages both incumbent and possible entrepreneurship, 
increasing firm costs and decreasing economic incentives to become an entrepreneur.
From  our perspective, six remarks are necessary. First, positive externalities of labour market 
regulation and of a well-funded social security system are disregarded: minimum wages, restriction 
of working hours, employment protection and restriction on the use of fixed-term contracts are 
considered barriers and sources of delay for business, in spite of the wide and controversial 
empirical and theoretical debate on these issues (see Becker 1964; Berg and Cazes 2007; Card and 
Krueger 1995; Eyraut and Saget 2005; Fox 2006; Lee and McCann 2007; Neri et al. 2001; 
Williamson 1995). The less a country regulates, the better the score the indicator assigns. Criticisms 
have been made that it is possible to change a DB ranking without improving business (Channel 
2008). Empirical research on labour market has shown that it is possible to improve the DB ranking 
but making, at the same time, business and quality of life worse
22. It seems relevant that DB08 
highlights that it is now possible
23 for an economy to receive the highest score on the ease of 
employing workers – indicating the most flexible labor regulation – and comply with all 187 ILO 
conventions (IBRD and WB 2008b). For the first time DB09 recognizes the necessity of a good 
balance between worker protection and labour market flexibility and lists the countries that have 
ratified the four ILO conventions which are considered relevant for the indicator. This aspect, in 
any case, is not included in the assessment of the policy of a country. Consequently, not only does 
21 see Lunghini, Silva and Targetti Lenti (2001) for a critical analysis to neoclassical approach in labour market. 
22 See the cases of Argentina and Bulgaria analysed in Berg and Cazes (2007). 
23 Emphasis of the author.DB not value the compliance with ILO regulation, but also it does not establish any minimum 
regulation standards to meet. 
Second, the index does not consider any interaction between regulation in different areas. For 
example, flexibility in labour market and taxes to finance passive and active labour market policies, 
are necessarily connected in flexicurity systems, which are economically and socially superior to 
flexibility systems (Auer 2007; Berg and Cazes 2007). Moreover, by stating that Denmark, Hong 
Kong (China), New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States are among the countries with the most 
flexible labor regulation overall (DB04: 83), the DB report completely decontextualises labour 
regulations from the overall institutional and political framework of a country, disregarding how 
dramatically welfare systems vary among the countries quoted. 
A third remark is the narrow focus of the indicator on flexibility of the labour force. Critical for an 
entreprenerial economy is the quality of the workers: the Kauffman Foundation (2007) stresses that 
entrepreneurs tell us that perhaps the most significant constraint on their future growth, and on the 
growth of future entrepreneurs, is the difficulty finding and attracting ‘talent’ – highly skilled, 
entrepreneurial workers. Fourth, in post-conflict dynamics, the above mentioned aspect is critically 
intertwined with the necessity to re-settle displaced working forces and to re-create an environment 
conducive to entrepreneurial development. It is worth noting that civil war creates an exodus of the 
most skilled human capital (Collier 1994); displaced communities need to be re-integrated and to 
find income-earning opportunities, while demobilized soldiers are likely to be unemployed. 
Notwithstanding the context specific nature of the situation, it is also plausible to hypothesize a 
substantial number of demobilized soldiers who are unskilled, or at least poorly-skilled outside the 
military sphere (Collier 1994 for the cases of Uganda and Ethiopia) and seriously needing to adapt 
their competences to a new environment. 
Fifth, the position of working women in a post-conflict environment acquires particular aspects to 
consider. During conflicts, women are likely to have been wide employed in order to sustain the 
war-economy. It must also be considered that a substantial number of families are likely to rely on working women in a post-conflict period. Given that an economy has to be shifted into peaceful 
activity, that women are typically vulnerable economic agents and that social services are likely to 
be weak in post-conflict countries, it is very necessary to assess the relative position of women in 
labour market and their possibility of being productively re-allocated. 
Fifth, this remark leads us to consider the assumptions of the indicator: the worker is a full time, 42 
year old, non-executive and male employee with 20 years of tenure in the same firm; he is a lawful 
citizen, of the same race and religion of the majority of the country’s population and is not a 
member of a labour union, unless membership is mandatory (on the representativeness of this case 
study, see Berg and Cazes 2007). Particularly in this case, comparability and simplification risk 
disregarding crucial aspects in addressing and coping with social and economic development, not 
only, but especially, in post-conflict dynamics. DB does not deal with phenomena whose aftermaths 
are dramatic not only in social and legal but also economic terms. Ethnic and religious segregation, 
exodus, return migrations and the connected possible increase in working and entrepreneurial skills 
are all aspects which are not possible to disregard in tackling processes of entrepreneurial 
development in fragile states (Naudé 2007). 
Finally, the possible trade-off between a highly flexible labour market and the development of 
workers skills and competencies (Antonelli 2009) is disregarded not only by the indicator here 
considered but also by academic literature. The relevance of this trade-off seems particularly severe 
in a fragmented environment in which the reconstruction of social and labour ties and the 
strengthening of individual skills is pivotal. 
Assessment of the dealing with construction permits indicator
DB policy recommendations on  dealing with construction permits  (until DB08 ‘dealing with 
licenses’) focus on the simplification of procedures (i.e. give builders a step-by-step specific chart 
and do not mandate use of specific materials, DB06; discard obsolete licensing regulations every 
decade, DB07; make information easily available, introduce online licence applications and consolidate project clearances DB06 2008), limitation of regulators’ rent-seeking and corruption 
(i.e. reduce licensing requirements and curb
24 inspections, DB08) and on efficiency (i.e. update 
zoning maps periodically, DB06; adjust licenses and inspections to the size and nature of the project 
and involve the private sector, DB07). The greater amount of the licences issued, the cheaper and 
faster the procedures, and the better the score. The necessity of cutting the red tape of a burdensome 
administration represents a goal worth pursuing. But the risks of prioritizing policy reforms in 
accordance with this maxim are serious. From this perspective regulation of licensing, as well as 
labour regulation, being a barrier to business, is seen as a source of costs, delays and rigidity. The 
problem that DB perspective brings about is twofold: firstly, the automatic connection between less 
regulation of business and development is presented as evidence-based and therefore often regarded 
as unquestionable; secondly, DB does not establish minimum regulation standards to meet. 
DB analyze procedures, time and cost of building a warehouse. The choice seems peculiar. The 
explicit rationale of this choice seems even more peculiar: because warehouse do not house people, 
there are fewer safety concerns than with construction of offices and homes. At worst, a company’s 
goods could be destroyed by fire, collapse or flooding. What would it take to build such a 
warehouse legally?(DB06). The case study adopted leads to avoiding valuing any security, health 
or environmental regulation, omitting to deal with pivotal features of the phenomena analysed and 
compromising seriously the analysis. A common remark is that DB is likely to be beset by poor 
understanding, which can lead to misuse (Bakvis 2006; Channel 2008; Arnt and Oman 2006). The 
remark seems to miss the point, ignoring that the ranking system and the normative approach de 
facto  tends to undermine the role of regulation in areas as security, health and environmental 
protection. The recommendation of don’t mandate use of specific materials (DB06) in order to 
avoid the problem of not up-to-date buildings codes, seems here particularly relevant. 
As previously mentioned, the DB theoretical premise and Baumol’s theory on the supply of 
entrepreneurship converge regarding the crucial role played by institutions and policy in favouring 
24 It is worth noting the linguistic choice: in DB 2006 the same recommendation was introduce risk-based inspection, a 
much more neutral expression.entrepreneurship. They instead greatly diverge on the issue of the nature of entrepreneurship. The 
reports rely on the implicit hypothesis of an automatic positive relationship between what is defined 
as a better business environment and development. The question is therefore not addressed at all, 
taking for granted the productive function of entrepreneurship in society. On the contrary, Baumol’s 
central message is that the exercise of entrepreneurship can sometimes be unproductive or even 
destructive (1990), and that the role of the rules of the game in the economic system is to induce a 
productive allocation of entrepreneurial resources. Therefore entrepreneurship can be productive, 
innovative, with a positive economic and social role or rent-seeking, parasitic or criminal. This 
statement has important policy implications: supporting existing SMEs does not necessarily imply 
supporting productive entrepreneurship, and adopting the point of view of the entrepreneur does not 
necessarily imply assuming a socially and economically sustainable perspective. 
As already mentioned, this statement is pivotal in addressing post-conflict strategies aimed at 
fostering productive entrepreneurship. As Cooper (2006) notes, economic war systems often don’t 
reflect a specific and alternative system of profit, being rather deeply rooted both in pre and post-
conflict economic structures. The DB premise, on the contrary, leads to disregarding quality and 
allocation of the entrepreneurial resources, giving fuel to a one size can fit all strategy (DB04) 
based upon a quantitative approach: there is a precise set of policies which exert a positive effect on 
the business environment and on the society as a whole and that can easily be applied to different 
contexts and the response of the recipients are predictable and evidence-based. The analysis depicts 
a sort of trickle-down effect which leads from a more ‘business friendly’ environment to 
development. As a result, DB policy recommendations often end in a focus on short-term horizons 
and on the relative ease in implementing the reforms. The statement at the basis of this position is 
outlined in one of the background papers (Djankov et al. 2007): not only institutional, geographical 
and historical factors, but also policies that can be modified without enormous difficulty exert a 
deep influence in economic development. From this perspective, regulation of licences and labour, 
being a barrier to business, is seen as a source of costs, delays and rigidity.The precise roadmap depicted, the short-term horizons adopted and the normative approach, all lead 
DB to focus on a standardisation, simplification and speed of reforms in a sort of race in which the 
country which reforms the most gets the higher score (sport terminology is often used in DB 
reports, see, for example, WB, IFC, 2008). The focus is therefore on reforms considered easy to 
implement in different contexts. This approach is also reflected by the methodology of the 
construction of the index (WB, IFC 2008c; 2009). Following the logic of what gets measured gets 
done  (DB05 2007, 2008), DB emphasises the number rather than the quality of the reforms 
undertaken, with the risk of decontextualised policy recommendations
25.
Whilst conditions of building licences should vary according to the features and historical value of 
the building or the town, recent important literature (Kuesel et al. 2008) has highlighted the critical 
role of environmental concern in social and economic development. 
The perspective adopted seems unable to cope with  the problems and needs of a post-conflict 
environment: strong commitment in reconstruction of war-damaged buildings and infrastructures; 
presence of an uneven playing field, having the market become less competitive during war-time 
(Collier 1994), and the necessity of a comprehensive effort of town and infrastructure planning. 
 
Concluding remarks
The   analysis   carried  out   in   the   paper   identifies   three   pivotal   aspects   of   entrepreneurship 
development which need to be considered in fragile and post-conflict states and which are 
disregarded by DBI.
First, the ambiguous and ubiquitous role of entrepreneurship, which is neither positive or negative 
in essence. Second, the complex and intertwined legacies between pre-conflict, conflict and post-
conflict economic systems. Lastly, the consequently central role played by incentives in economic 
systems, which cannot be reduced to lessen regulation and lessen room for public intervention.
25  For example, the poor results in the case of formalization of real estate property in Peru, analyzed in Morris 
Guerinoni (2004). See the analysis presented in Arruñada (2007).DB indicators represent a precious source of information, testified by the widespread diffusion of 
DB reports and by the influence they exert in the political arena. In an assessment of DB pros and 
cons it seems necessary to discriminate between the positive and normative functions of the 
indicators, because the problems that arise and the policy implications are different.
As far as the descriptive power of DB is concerned, two kind of problems have arisen in the paper. 
The first question is about what the indicators are really measuring. The DB reports, as well as the 
background papers on which the indicators are constructed, lack definition of the phenomena 
analysed. The concepts of entrepreneurship and development implicitly assumed in the reports have 
been analysed, highlighting to what extent the measures chosen can hinder the explanatory power of 
the indicators, failing in addressing the multifaceted process through which individuals become 
entrepreneurs, especially in post-conflict areas.
A second issue concerns the short-term, private perspective adopted by the indicators. On the one 
hand, the indicators seem to measure aspects of business environment often linked to a short-term 
view of the business activity, disregarding a more sustainable perspective. The relationships 
between enterprises, both inter and intrasectoral, and the characteristics of workers are not 
considered. This approach disregards the sources and the role of innovation, which is the essence of 
an entrepreneurial economy. On the other, the risks of adopting only a private perspective are 
serious.  Private and social benefits do not always converge  and a multifaceted  and more 
comprehensive view is extremely important in public policy analysis, design and implementation. 
The perspective of the entrepreneur, which is crucial in the analysis, and the role of public 
institution are neither mutually exclusive nor incompatible. 
The main problem with the DB indicators seems to be rooted in their explicit normative power. This 
aspect is particularly important as far as post-conflict countries are concerned. DB indicators draw a 
path that is not always consistent with the purpose they declare, disregarding context-specific 
variables which are critical in the process of reconstruction and development.References 
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Verlag: Münster.Table 6.1: The starting a business indicator
INDICATOR BACKGROUND 
PAPER
SUBINDICATORS ASSUMPTION ON THE BUSINESS
Starting a 
business
The   Regulation   of 
Entry 
Djankov,
La   Porta,   Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer (2002) 
Number of procedures (any 
interaction of the company 
founders with external parties)
Caveat: procedures that the 
company undergoes to connect 
electricity, water, gas and waste 
disposal services are not included
 limited liability company (if more 
than one, the most popular form) 
 operates in the economy’s largest 
business city;
 100% domestically owned (5 
owners, none of whom is a legal 
entity)
 start-up capital of 10 times income 
per capita at the end of 2007, paid 
in cash;
 general industrial or commercial 
activities, not foreign trade 
activities and not products subject 
to a special tax regime. No heavily 
polluting production processes. 
 leases the commercial plant, no real 
estate;
 no investment incentives or any 
special benefits;
 between 10 and 50 national 
employees 1 month after the 
commencement of operations
 turnover of at least 100 times 
income per capita;
 company deed 10 pages long
 the entrepreneur is aware of all 
entry regulations and their sequence 
from the beginning but has had no 
prior contact with any officials.
Time (days)
Cost (% of income per capita)
Caveat: time spent on gathering 
information is ignored
Paid-in minimum capital (% of 
income per capita)Table 6.2: The employing workers indicator
INDICATOR BACKGROUND 
PAPER
                    ASSUMPTIONS
        business                   worker
SUBINDICATORS
Employing workers
(until DB2006, Hiring 
The regulation of 
Labour Botero, 
limited liability company 
in the country’s most 
populous city;
100% domestically owned
operates in the 
manufactoring sector
201 employees
subject to collective 
bargaining agreements in 
countries where such 
agreements cover more 
than half the manifacturing 
sector and apply even to 
42 year old, non-
executive, full-time, 
male employee
has worked at the same 
company for 20 years
salary plus benefits 
equal to the country’s 
average wage during 
the entire period of his 
employment
lawful citizen, same 
race and religion of the 








max cumulative duration 
of fixed-term contracts
ratio of minimum wage for a trainee 
or first employee to the average value 
added per worker




workweek can consist of 5.5 days
workweek can extend to 50 hours 
(for seasonal increase in production, 2 
months a year)
paid annual vacation 21 working days 
or fewer
Difficulty of firing 
index
redundancy disallowed as basis for 
terminating workers
notify a third party to terminate
 1 redundant worker
notify a third party to terminate 
a group of 25 redundant workers
approval from a third party
to terminate 1 redundant workerand firing workers) 
 
Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de Silanes, 
Shleifer (2004)
firms not party to them
abides by every law and 
regulation but does not 
grant workers more 
benefits than mandated by 




resides in the country 
most populous city
not a member of a 
labour union, unless 
membership is 
mandatory
approval from a third party 
to terminate a group of 25 redundant 
workers
reassignment or retraining options 
before redundancy termination
priority rules apply for redundancies
priority rules apply for reemployment
Non-wage 
labour cost
All social security payments and payroll taxes associated with 
hiring an employee (% of the worker’s salary)
Firing cost Cost of advance notice requirements, severance payments and 
penalties due when terminating a redundant worker 